G2 - Intelligence Reports

[thumper]

1954 :
It is seen by many military scholars as one of the great battles of the 20th century -- and a defining moment in the history of Southeast Asia. And yet the Battle of Dien Bien Phu receives rarely more than a passing mention in most history texts.

After World War II, France was able to reinstall its colonial government in what was then known as Indochina. By 1946 a Vietnamese independence movement, led by communist Ho Chi Minh, was fighting French troops for control of northern Vietnam. The Viet Minh, as the insurgents were called, used guerrilla tactics that the French found difficult to counter.

In late 1953, as both sides prepared for peace talks in the Indochina War, French military commanders picked Dien Bien Phu, a village in northwestern Vietnam near the Laotian and Chinese borders, as the place to pick a fight with the Viet Minh.

"It was an attempt to interdict the enemy's rear area, to stop the flow of supplies and reinforcements, to establish a redoubt in the enemy's rear and disrupt his lines," says Douglas Johnson, research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. "The enemy could then be lured into a killing ground. There was definitely some of that thinking involved."

Hoping to draw Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas into a classic battle, the French began to build up their garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The stronghold was located at the bottom of a bowl-shaped river valley, about 10 miles long. Most French troops and supplies entered Dien Bien Phu from the air -- either landing at the fort's airstrip or dropping in via parachute.

Dien Bien Phu's main garrison also would be supported by a series of firebases -- strongpoints on nearby hills that could bring down fire on an attacker. The strongpoints were given women's names, supposedly after the mistresses of the French commander, Gen. Christian de Castries. The French assumed any assaults on their heavily fortified positions would fail or be broken up by their artillery.

The size of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu swelled to somewhere between 13,000 and 16,000 troops by March 1954. About 70 percent of that force was made up of members of the French Foreign Legion, soldiers from French colonies in North Africa, and loyal Vietnamese.

Viet Minh guerrillas and troops from the People's Army of Vietnam surrounded Dien Bien Phu during the buildup within the French garrison. Their assault on March 13 proved almost immediately how vulnerable and flawed the French defenses were.

Dien Bien Phu's outlying firebases were overrun within days of the initial assault. And the main part of the garrison was amazed to find itself coming under heavy, withering artillery fire from the surrounding hills. In a major logistical feat, the Viet Minh had dragged scores of artillery pieces up steeply forested hillsides the French had written off as impassable.

The French artillery commander, distraught at his inability to bring counterfire on the well-defended and well-camouflaged Viet Minh batteries, went into his dugout and killed himself.

The heavy Viet Minh bombardment also closed Dien Bien Phu's airstrip. French attempts to resupply and reinforce the garrison via parachute were frustrated -- as pilots attempting to fly over the region found themselves facing a barrage from anti-aircraft guns. It was during the resupply effort that two civilian pilots, James McGovern and Wallace Buford, became the first Americans killed in Vietnam combat.

The supply planes were forced to fly higher, and their parachute drops became less accurate. Much of what was intended for the French forces -- including food, ammunition and, in one case, essential intelligence information -- landed instead in Viet Minh territory. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh steadily reduced the French-held area -- using what their commander, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, called "a tactic of combined nibbling and full-scale attack."

Closed off from the outside world, under constant fire, and flooded by monsoon rains, conditions inside Dien Bien Phu became inhuman. Casualties piled up inside the garrison's hospital.

Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh on May 7. At least 2,200 members of the French forces died during the siege -- with thousands more taken prisoner. Of the 50,000 or so Vietnamese who besieged the garrison, there were about 23,000 casualties -- including an estimated 8,000 killed.

The fall of Dien Bien Phu shocked France and brought an end to French Indochina.

"The very first memory I have of talking foreign affairs with my father was when Dien Bien Phu fell," Anil Malhotra, a World Bank official from India, said in a recent interview. "It was a source of great pride in the developing world. A small Asian nation had defeated a colonial power, convincingly. It changed history."

Following the French withdrawal, Vietnam was officially divided into a communist North and non-communist South -- setting the stage for U.S. involvement.

In 1963, as Washington was deepening its commitment in Vietnam, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made a telling remark to a U.S. official.

"If you want to, go ahead and fight in the jungles of Vietnam," Khrushchev said. "The French fought there for seven years and still had to quit in the end. Perhaps the Americans will be able to stick it out for a little longer, but eventually they will have to quit, too."

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war.../11/spotlight/

[CarnageCAB]

Nice information you got there...tis scenario will remind me of Battlefield Vietnam the game...goodtimes,goodtimes

[thumper]

Reports from a Montagnards - 1966

Near the end of my stay at Quang Tri, the Lang Vei Montagnards were the victims of another tragic case of mistaken identity. In 1966 a group of the Bru tribe was living adjacent to the Special Forces A-Team base at Lang Vei in Huong Hoa district. With the Laos border only a kilometer away, it was the district's westernmost Montagnard settlement. It was little more than a small hilly plateau, with the Special Forces outpost at the top and-100 yards to the north-the crescent-shaped Bru settlement.

For months the VC had warned the tribesmen not to provide troops or information to the Americans. They told the Bru they were wrong if they thought the Americans could protect them. The tribesmen ignored the warning, and in September the VC attacked. The raid was quick and devastating. The VC easily penetrated the Bru settlement and burned the tribal houses with flamethrowers. The Special Forces on the hill could do nothing -- the VC kept them pinned down in their bunkers with a mortar barrage while they destroyed the village. By the time the A-Team even knew what was happening and had called Khe Sanh for help, the attack was over. Almost every Bru family lost a relative, and many were completely wiped out. The VC had kept their promise.

[thumper]

Beginnings of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program

There were two principal reasons for the creation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. One was that the U.S. Mission in Saigon believed that a paramilitary force should be developed from the minority groups of South Vietnam in order to strengthen and broaden the counterinsurgency effort of the Vietnamese government. The other was that the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda, partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government, and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land holdings.

One major study of the situation in Southeast Asia concluded that in 1961 the danger of Viet Cong domination of the entire highlands of South Vietnam was very real, that the efforts of the Vietnamese Army to secure the highlands against Viet Cong infiltration were ineffective, and that the natural buffer zone presented by the highland geography and Montagnard population was not being utilized properly to prevent Communist exploitation. The government was, in fact, failing to exercise any sovereignty over its highland frontiers or its remote lowland districts in the Mekong Delta where other ethnic and religious minority groups were established. This lack of control deprived the government of any early intelligence of enemy attacks and any real estimate of Viet Cong infiltration. The Communists, on the other hand, continued to exploit the buffer zone, and there was always the danger that the insurgents would use this territory as a springboard into the more heavily populated areas.

[thumper]

* Insertions : Instant reinsertion at bases. US may spawn at Montegnard base w/ Montegnard Village Chief's blessings.

* Special rules : 15bps / 280 fps max - all hits count

* US General : Ace (10-15% of all forces)

* VC General : Innerwolf (50% of all forces)

* Montegnard Village Chief: Recon Ranger (35%-40% of all forces)

* Awards : Expect award certificates for Valor, MVT, MVP, Sportsmanship and Most Valuable Sniper

* Tanks -- 2 tanks per side allowed. Must be golf cart / Mule / lawn mower or 4wheeler based. Walking speed only. No player allowed w/in 10 feet. Take out w/ 2" air powered nerf rockets only.

* Choppers : Can't shoot or be shot unless on ground. 6 passenger Huey's and 24 passenger Chinooks expected. Dont birddog choppers -and chopper don't land w/in 150' of enemy player.

* Snipers : Expect 5 snipers per side. Sniper's to use special paint to score bonus points. Shots to be called in via radio and verified to score. Yards may be "trained" as snipers.

* Montegnards are neutral 3rd team - starting as unmarked and "untrained". Yards may become "trained" by participation in successfull US mission and marked as trained by US general.

* Bases may be overrun and taken, but only held for 60 seconds and immediately vacated by 200' by all enemy. Bases are worth 0 points unless part of a mission.

[thumper]

1. Can helicopters attack tanks with a law?
a: no - laws must be fired from the ground. I think we need as hard and fast rule that choppers dont shoot - at least for now.

2. Can Helicopters engage enemy helicopters in
flight? Say with a law or a hand thrown nerf
rocket?
a: no - choppers cant shoot or be shot "unless on the ground"


3. Can an enemy bunker or tower be taken out with a law?How about a grenade?
a: no - not for now. It takes a lot of refs to allow laws to take out bunkers, and we run games on the lean side refwise. Once the area raps up, I could see having some "demo" missions included - but I think Switchback has included enough complexity for this iteration - but I understand where you are coming from.


4. Can we set claymores and mines in enemy
territory?Can we set booby traps in
enemy strongholds and bunkers and remote
detonate them when occupied?
a: sounds fine w/ me. The only real problems Ive seen is when recovering your claymores.

5. Is the decided chopper landing distance going to definitly be 150 from enemy?
a: I would like to get some feedback from the players on how to accomplish landings safely. The 150' rule sounds good on paper - and has worked moderately well at past games. In my mind the biggest thing choppers add to the game is there ability to change the battle lines as they fly over. There arent added as gunships. I also like the idea of "spybirds" - a "one seater" for radioing intel back to the C&C.

6. what is max allowable members on a chopper?Currently have two 6 man choppers and a 4 man chopper.
a: Its not the capacity im concerned about. Its the number. If the US Special Forces is constructing choppers, a 24 seater "Chinook" would be very cool and at most (2) 6 passenger huey's. In the construction of both, please include a tall white (or US) flag at each end to help the enemy players see the chopper.

Keep in mind that in order for choppers to operate, players on both sides must respect the rules - and this occassionally breaks down - meaning refs.
So having dracula on call to escort chopper missions is likely, but he can only be in one place at one time, ie. fewer choppers is better. Ill tune the rules about chopper operations as this thread is chewed on.

[thumper]

Letter from Ho Chi Minh

To His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President, United States of America

Your Excellency:

On February 10, I received your message. This is my reply. Vietnam is thousands of miles away from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva conference, the U.S. has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in North Vietnam with a view to prolonging the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neocolony and a military base of the United States. For over two years now, the U.S. government has, with its air and naval forces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country.

The U.S. government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings and destruction in Vietnam. May I ask you: Who has perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It is the United States and satellite troops. The U.S. government is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam.

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national independence movement, and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of U.S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American people.

The U.S. government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease this aggression. This is the only way to restoration of peace. The U.S. government must stop definitely and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Such is the basis of the five-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles and provision of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam; it is the basis of a correct political solution to the Vietnam problem.

In your message you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. If the U.S. government really wants these talks, it must first of all stop unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the U.S. could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the U.S. government will act in accordance with reason.

Sincerely,

Ho Chi Minh

[thumper]

Beginnings of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program - continued

Dissatisfaction among the Montagnards reached a point where in 1958 one of the principal tribes, the Rhade, organized a passive march in protest. Vietnamese officials countered by confiscating the tribesmen's crossbows and spears, an act that further alienated the Montagnards.

The indifference of the Vietnamese to the needs and feelings of the tribesmen grew directly out of their attitude toward the Montagnards, whom the Vietnamese had traditionally regarded as an inferior people, calling them "moi," or savages, and begrudging them their tribal lands. This attitude on the part of the Vietnamese plagued the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program from the beginning. Not until 1966 did the Vietnamese, in their desire to bring the tribes under government control, begin to refer to the Montagnards as Dong Bao Throng, "compatriots of the highlands." Even so, the animosity between Montagnards and Vietnamese continued to be a major problem.

The Montagnard Culture

The Montagnards constitute one of the largest minority groups in Vietnam. The term Montagnard, loosely used, like the word Indian, applies to more than a hundred tribes of primitive mountain people, numbering from 600,000 to a million and spread over all of Indochina. In South Vietnam there are some twenty-nine tribes, all told more than 200,000 people. Even within the same tribe, cultural patterns and linguistic characteristics can vary considerably from village to village. In spite of their dissimilarities, however, the Montagnards have many common features that distinguish them from the Vietnamese who inhabit the lowlands. The Montagnard tribal society is centered on the village and the people depend largely on slash-and-burn agriculture for their livelihood. Montagnards have in common an ingrained hostility toward the Vietnamese and a desire to be independent.

Throughout the course of the French Indochina War, the Viet Minh worked to win the Montagnards to their side. Living in the highlands, these mountain people had been long isolated by both geographic and economic conditions from the developed areas of Vietnam, and they occupied territory of strategic value to an insurgent movement. The French also enlisted and trained Montagnards as soldiers, and many fought on their side.

Since the Rhade (Rah-day) tribe is fairly representative of the Montagnards, a description of the way of life of the villagers will serve as a good example of the environment in which the Special Forces worked in Vietnam.

The Rhade were, furthermore, the first to be approached and to participate in the CIDG program. For many years, the Rhade have been considered the most influential and strategically located of the Montagnard tribes in the highlands of Vietnam. Mainly centered around the village of Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province, the Rhade are also found in Quang Due, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa Provinces. While there are no census records for these people, it has been estimated that the tribe numbers between 100,000 and 115,000, with 68,000 living in Ban Me Thuot.

The Rhade proved to be enthusiastic participants in the CIDG program in the beginning because the early projects were, they felt, pleasing to the spirits and helpful to their villages. If these two requirements were satisfied (and in many instances they were not later on), the Rhade, and the Montagnards in general, were quite willing to work hard in the CIDG program.

The Montagnards were not, of course, the only minority group involved in the CIDC, program; other groups were Cambodians, Nung tribesmen from the highlands of North Vietnam, and ethnic Vietnamese from the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects.

[Aerion]

Everyone knows Military Intelligence is an oxymoron!!

[thumper]

In February 1962 there was one full U.S. Special Forces A detachment deployed in Darlac Province on the Buon Enao project. When the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established, with General Paul D. Harkins commanding, a special warfare branch was included in the J-3 staff section. In May a joint agreement between the U.S. Mission and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was made to co-ordinate the CIDG program between them. The U.S. Mission initially retained complete responsibility for both the logistical and operational aspects of the program. The counterpart organization to the joint U.S. Mission and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, structure was the Vietnamese Special Forces under the control of the Vietnam government. In July the U.S. Department of Defense made the decision to transfer complete responsibility for Special Forces operations to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, thus making the Army responsible for U.S. support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. The Department of Defense arranged for a colonel qualified in unconventional operations to assume command of the Special Forces in Vietnam and provided for flexibility with respect to supply procedures and the expenditure of funds so that the efficiency and effectiveness of the CIDG program could be maintained. The transfer of responsibility—codenamed Operation SWITCHBACK—was to be accomplished in phases and completed by 1 July 1963.